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I. Inductive Yankees, Deductive Latinos
An abiding delight of professional collaboration between a North American
lawyer and a Latin American colleague is their charming propensity to reach a
common destination by opposite routes. Schooled in the case system, the North
American approaches the shared task empirically. For example, if the objective
is to design a foreign investment structure, the North American attorney does not
ponder legal doctrines so much as he recalls successful instances of similar
structures he previously designed, then adds variations to adapt those structures
to the new project. In contrast, the Latin American colleague-as a true disciple
of his code training in the civil law-reasons from juridical principles, rational-
izing and refining them to achieve the intended result. In essence the North
American proceeds inductively, like Aristotle, from instances to hypothesis,
while the Latin American advances deductively, like Plato, from concept to
application. The delight is that their opposite procedures usually lead to an
identical conclusion, and in the process each is enriched by exposure to the
other's way of thought.
Those divergent thinking patterns are reflected in differing conceptions of the
source of international law. North Americans tend to regard a principle of inter-
national law as the transnational application of national practices, while Latin
Americans are inclined to view it as national recognition of a nation-transcending
norm. Nevertheless, those differing perceptions, like the opposite approaches of
Yankees and Latinos to lawyerly tasks, are more ingratiating than
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contentious. There is little evidence that nations at a given stage of political and
economic development are markedly inconsistent, on grounds of their heritage of
common law or civil law, concerning the rules of international law they will
apply.
Indeed, the conceptual differences between Aristotelian Yankees and Platonic
Latinos concerning the source of international law are as delightful, and as
enriching, as their opposite pathways to professional collaboration. "See here!"
asserts the Yankee. "There would be no international law at all if nations did not
pact to make it so." "Not in the least!" counters the Latino. "The principles that
those treaties reiterate are inherent in the just relations of peoples; they are as
authoritative as nationhood itself. Besides, international law can create national
law, as easily as the other way around." So goes the dialogue.
II. The Andean Argument
In the context of those delightful differences, the last two decades of treaty
relations among the Andean nations on the subject of foreign investment con-
stitute a persuasive argument for the Latino view that international law can create
national law. Those relations not only constitute an impressive body of public
international law, but have produced comprehensive national enactments of pri-
vate international law and, through those enactments, have become an enduring
matrix of purely domestic law as well.
Andean treaty law on foreign investment is a product of the Agreement of
Cartagena (1969),' which created the Andean Common Market (ANCOM)
among Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Article 27 of the Agree-
ment committed those nations to adopt a "common system for the treatment of
foreign capital." Pursuant to article 27 the Andean Commission issued Decision
24 (1970),2 a code of uniform restrictions on foreign investment in the ANCOM
nations.
Viewed from our present perspective, Decision 24 seems a rather outmoded
artifact of the law. In the last two decades the less developed world has accom-
plished such an abrupt about-face on the subject of foreign investment that it is
difficult to recall to mind the xenophobic era in which the Andean code was born.
It was a time of strident protectionism and truculent statism, in which the capital-
I. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, opened for signature May 26, 1969, 49
SfNTESIS MENSUAL 283 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969) (English translation, incomplete
text). (English translations in this article are by the author.)
2. R~gimen Comtn de Tratamiento a los Capitales Extranjeros y sobre Marcas, Patentes,
Licencias y Regalfas, adopted Dec. 31, 1970, VII(l), RJ I [hereinafter Decision 24]. (In this article
Decisions under the Agreement of Cartagena and, unless otherwise sourced, items of national
legislation are identified by page references to their recompilation in parts (Roman numerals) and
volumes (Arabic numerals) of Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Instituto Para La Integraci6n De
Amdrica Latina, REGIMEN JURiDICO DE LAS INVERSIONES EXTRANJERAS EN LOS PAiSES DE LA ALADI
(1985 & Supp. [hereinafter RJI).
VOL. 24, NO. 3
ANDEAN DECISIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 645
exporting nations were admonished by United Nations resolutions that pro-
claimed a "New International Economic Order," and foreign equity was ex-
cluded or emasculated by such restrictive measures as "Nigerianization," the
Malaysian bumiputra rules, the Canadian Foreign Investment Review Act, and
Mexico's Yankee-blocking Echeverrfan Wall. 3 In these sobered 1990s those
strictures seem millennia away.
True to its xenophobic provenance, Decision 24 pledged the ANCOM nations
to restrict foreign investment to a degree that was unprecedented, as a peacetime
multistate measure, in the contemporary non-Marxist world. Astounded com-
mentators described Decision 24 as "a new juristic phenomenon, ' 4 "[t]he
world's first . . . regional system of prior restraints on the entry of new private
sector investment from outside," 5 and "the harshest restrictions on foreign cap-
ital and technology imposed by a group of Western countries in recent times.''
6
Except for Chile, which prudently withdrew from ANCOM's hubristic com-
mitment to economic self-reliance, each ANCOM nation ratified and imple-
mented Decision 24 with national enactments in which the restrictive require-
ments of Decision 24 were met or exceeded. The most zealous implementer was
Peru, which had anticipated Decision 24 with industrial sector laws limiting the
access of private capital, both national and foreign; those she retained and ex-
panded in the spirit of the new Andean ideal. 7
As the 1970s and 1980s wore on, however, the restrictions of Decision 24 lost
favor in most ANCOM nations, and there ensued two decades of relenting AN-
COM Decisions and amending national enactments, in the course of which
ANCOM itself was reconstituted by the virtual disassociation of Chile and the
accession of Venezuela. The relenting Decisions traced a massive retreat from
the rigid prohibitions of Decision 24 to the permissive standards of Decision 220
(1987). 8 The amending enactments anticipated or adopted Decision 220 in every
ANCOM nation but Bolivia and, in every ANCOM nation but Peru, substantially
liberalized the original national implementations of Decision 24. 9
History will debate the substantive merits of those measures. Was Decision 24
inherently flawed by economic miscalculation? Could the ANCOM nations have
3. The origins of Decision 24 are described in Murphy, Decision 24, Mexicanization and the
New International Economic Order: The Anatomy of Disincentive, 13 TEX. INT'L L.J. 289 (1978).
4. Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for a Normative
Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 763 (1972).
5. Id. at 777.
6. Schleisser, Restrictions on Foreign Investment in the Andean Common Market, 5 INT'L LAW.
586, 586 (1971).
7. The original legislation implementing Decision 24 is analyzed in Murphy, The Andean
Common Market and Mexico: A Foreign Investment Profile, 13 TEX. INT'L L.J. 307 (1978).
8. VII(l) RJ (Supp. 3) 1, effective May 11, 1987, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 978 (1988) (English
translation) [hereinafter Decision 220].
9. Decision 220 and its national implementations are described in Murphy, The Quiet Revolu-
tion in Andean Foreign Investment Laws, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ch. 10 (1989).
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avoided their chaotic 1990s by encouraging, rather than restricting, foreign cap-
ital in the 1970s? Was Decision 220 the appropriate solution, but applied too
late? Wise men will differ in their answers to those questions but, regardless of
one's views on the merits of the last two decades of ANCOM Decisions and
enactments on foreign investment, in terms of juridical origins they reveal two
fascinating levels of devolution, in which the public international law of the
Decisions created the private international law of the national enactments, and
the national enactments in turn engendered significant rules and orientations of
purely domestic law.
III. From Public to Private
The first level of devolution that the Andean measures accomplished was
inherent in the basic purpose of Decision 24. In order to require the ANCOM
nations to maintain uniformly restrictive foreign investment laws, Decision 24
was obliged to say what a foreign investment law should be. Especially in the
context of the Western Hemisphere, that was not an easy task. When Decision 24
was adopted, the nearest approximation to a foreign investment law in the United
States was (as it remains, now augmented only by the vague contours of Exon-
Florio) a miscellaneous grab bag of disclosure requirements and enactments that
specified particular industrial sectors in which foreign-owned equity was ex-
cluded or especially regulated. In Canada foreign investment regulation was
more restrictive and administratively more integrated than in the United States,
but only slightly broader in scope. Foreign investment legislation in Mexico,
though roughly contemporary with Decision 24 in enactment, was not a single
law, but three laws that separately regulated investment, patents and trademarks,
and the licensing of technology. The law's original statutory form did not men-
tion foreign exchange at all. Some South American systems focused chiefly on
foreign exchange and added other elements as afterthoughts. In short, no single
enactment of the Americas gave the ANCOM Commission a particularly helpful
clue as to what issues a comprehensive foreign investment law should address.
In fact the field of foreign investment law can be perceived in many different
magnitudes. Seen most narrowly, foreign investment law deals only with the
transnational movement of equity and has nothing to do with business organi-
zations, loans, the sale of goods or services, licensing, debt/equity swaps, the
remittance of profits, or the foreign exchange in which all the others are actu-
alized. Seen most broadly, foreign investment law includes all those elements,
plus every other jural norm that can affect an enterprise. Finding a practical
median between those two dimensions was the Andean Commission's initial and
conceptually most challenging task.
Addressing that task, the Commission wisely realized that, in the twilight of
the Twentieth Century, "investing" involves more than the placement of equity;
to regulate equity while ignoring credit, foreign exchange, and licensing is to
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have a regulatory system for foreign investment that is incomplete. Conse-
quently, the Commission visualized the foreign investment law of an ANCOM
nation as an integrated enactment that regulates the influence of foreign enter-
prise within a national economy with particular reference to: (1) accessible
industrial sectors and permitted percentages of equity ownership; (2) available
credit and foreign exchange; and (3) acceptable provisions of inbound licenses.
That threefold formula was the structural essence of Decision 24. Regarding
equity, Decision 24 limited foreign ownership by sectoral restrictions (specify-
ing, industry by industry, what percentage of foreign-owned equity an ANCOM
nation could allow), compulsory divestiture (notably the "fade-out" requirement
that any new foreign-controlled enterprise must progressively divest itself to 51
percent national ownership within a specified period), and take-over rules that
generally forbade the acquisition by foreign investors of interests owned by
nationals. Regarding credit and foreign exchange, Decision 24 subjected in-
bound loans to any enterprise, foreign or national, to prior authorization and
registration; denied foreign investors access to medium- or long-term credit in
the national market; limited interest payments to affiliates to a formula amount;
and subjected dividend remittances abroad to prior authorization and annual
ceilings based on percentage of investment. Regarding licensing, Decision 24
subjected each inbound license of technology, patents, or trademarks to prior
approval and registration; prescribed in detail the clauses a license must and must
not contain; and prohibited royalties and tax deductibility in licenses between
affiliates.
In its perception of the interrelationship of those three aspects of foreign
investment, the Andean Commission was at the creative edge of regulatory
innovation in the Americas, and by organizing the prohibitions of Decision 24 on
that threefold scheme, the Commission invented the profile of a modem Western
Hemisphere foreign investment law. To a greater or lesser degree, that profile was
followed in the implementing enactments of each ANCOM nation. Even when
Decision 220 relaxed the strictures of Decision 24, the same profile persisted in
Decision 220 and in the national enactments that anticipated or implemented it.
In all probability the profile will endure, long after ANCOM is superseded and
forgotten, as a model for foreign investment laws in capital-importing nations of
the Americas and elsewhere. Decision 24 thus deserves recognition as a juridical
act of significant normative force and as an influential example of that remark-
able creature, the pact of public international law that generates-both by its
specific edict and by the force of its example-national enactments of private
international law.
IV. From International to Domestic
The first level of juridical devolution that the Andean measures accom-
plished-from public international law to private international law-is manifest
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in the explicit national enactments that now govern foreign investment in Co-
lombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The second level of devolution the An-
dean measure achieved is less obvious, and in two instances has only begun the
delicate process of parturition from private international law to purely domestic
law. The second level is all the more intriguing, however, for its subtlety and
because it addresses four areas of contrariety between Latin Americans and
North Americans. Those areas are: (1) identifying the shareholders of corpora-
tions; (2) distinguishing the legal personality of a business enterprise in its
jurisdiction of formation from the operational presence of the same enterprise in
another jurisdiction; (3) standardizing licensing terms; and (4) exorcising the
ubiquitous ghost of Carlos Calvo.
A. IDENTIFYING THE SHAREHOLDERS
A fundamental difference in the way business enterprise law has evolved in
North America, as distinguished from Latin America, lies in the identification of
shareholders of corporations. North American business corporation acts contem-
plate that certificates of share ownership will be issued in a manner that will
identify the shareholder and that such issuance and any subsequent transfer of the
certificated shares will be reflected in a stock record book maintained by the
enterprise in a manner to identify each issuee or transferee. Latin American law
classifies that as a system of nominative shares (in Spanish, acciones nominati-
vas, sometimes confusingly translated as "registered shares"). Historically,
Latin American business enterprise laws have not required certificates of share
ownership to be in nominative form. Instead they have permitted, either explic-
itly or by silence, share certificates to be issued without identification of the
issuee, and have not required issuers or transferees to be identified in stock record
books maintained by the enterprise. In Spanish parlance such shares are issued
al portador (to bearer) and are considered to belong to whoever physically
possesses the share certificates at the relevant time.
North and South have exchanged many aspersions on the subject of acciones
nominativas versus acciones al portador. North Americans perceive the bearer
share system as a calculated adjunct to tax evasion and other breaches of law.
Latin Americans regard the nominative share system as an unnecessary violation
of privacy and a paperwork impediment to share transfers. Nevertheless, in
recent years non-tax-haven Latin American nations have tended both to restrict
the use of acciones al portador and to require nominative shares to be used,
either generally or in especially regulated contexts.
The Latin American trend toward nominative shares received a powerful im-
petus from Decision 24. In order to restrict foreign investment by industrial
sectors, and to police the "fade-out" requirement that a new foreign-controlled
enterprise divest itself to national control, ANCOM nations were required to
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classify business enterprises on the basis of the percentages by which they were
owned by foreigners. Rather than requiring disclosures of share ownership to be
made only by foreigners or only by enterprises in which foreigners were in-
volved, the disclosure requirement was made universal by outlawing bearer
shares in all enterprises. Decision 24 imposed that requirement, not merely as an
admonition to ANCOM nations, but as a measure of direct legal effect: "The
capital of companies having shares must be represented by nominative shares." o
A following sentence required all existing bearer shares to be changed to nom-
inative form within one year. Decision 220 repeated the quoted words verbatim. I1
(It omitted the following sentence, because more than a year had elapsed since
Decision 24 became effective.) The prohibition of bearer shares is therefore ef-
fective in every ANCOM nation, either by a specific enactment adopting Decision
24 and (later) Decision 220 in their entireties, or by virtue of legislation that gives
all Decisions of the Andean Commission immediate national effect. Venezuela
separately included an explicit prohibition of new bearer shares in the liberalized
foreign investment law by which she anticipated Decision 220.12
Legalisms aside, ANCOM's repudiation of acciones al portador is a rather
amusing example of adversarial imitation. In order to protect themselves from
the privacy-insensitive, paperwork-prone Yankees, the ANCOM nations felt
obliged to adopt the privacy-insensitive, paperwork-prone Yankee institution of
nominative shares.
B. SUBSIDIARY VERSUS BRANCH
In Latin America the legal conceptualization of business enterprises has de-
veloped at different, but somewhat reciprocal, levels of sophistication than in
North America. As regards differentiation among locally formed enterprises, a
typical Latin American business enterprise law offers a broader and more ex-
plicitly correlated array of enterprises than does corresponding North American
legislation. For example, in a single Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles
3
Mexico makes available for formation a sociedad an6nima (ordinary corpora-
tion), a sociedad de responsabilidad limitada (limited liability company), a
sociedad en comandita simple (limited partnership), a sociedad en comandita
por acciones (joint stock company), a sociedad en nombre colectivo (general
partnership), and a sociedad cooperativa (cooperative society), plus a variable
capital alternative of five of them. By contrast, of those eleven types of enter-
10. Decision 24, supra note 2, art. 45.
It. Decision 220, supra note 8, art. 30.
12. Decreto No. 1200, art. 84, VII(3) RJ (Supp. 2) 1, effective Aug. 29, 1986.
13. Editorial Pornia, CtDIGo DE COMERCIO Y LEYES COMPLEMENTARIAS 173-229 (34th ed.
1978).
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prises, the basic Texas legislation on commercial enterprises, 14 by dint of three
separate statutes, can muster only three.
As regards differentiation between a locally formed enterprise and the local
presence of an enterprise formed elsewhere, however, Latin America's practice
is less developed. In Spanish even the vocabulary of such differentiation is
imprecise. When we say in English that Corporation X was "formed in," "in-
corporated in," or "organized under the laws of," Delaware, we clearly convey
the idea that Corporation X was born when its certificate of incorporation was
filed with the secretary of state of Delaware; and when we say that Corporation
X "established a branch in," or "qualified to do business in," Texas, we are
equally explicit that the secretary of state of Texas has issued it a certificate of
authority. The Spanish equivalents are a bit more vague. If Corporation X is
constituida in Nation Z, presumably it is incorporated under Z's laws, but what
if it is merely establecida or existente in Nation Z? The inference is not always
clear. As to branches, communication between North and South is further con-
fused by the tendency of Latin American lawyers to think of Corporation X and
its foreign branch as separate legal entities, so that it becomes uncertain whether
casa matriz means "parent corporation" or merely "head office"; whetherfilial
means "affiliate," "subsidiary," or "branch"; and, for that matter, whether a
parent corporation and its branch are a single empresa (enterprise) or two.
Decision 24 and its amending Decisions used those terminologies with only
approximate consistency' 5 and, in particular, failed to distinguish explicitly the
locally incorporated subsidiary of a foreign corporation from its locally regis-
tered branch. 16 The regulatory responsibilities the Decisions placed upon AN-
COM nations have, however, resulted in implementing enactments that are con-
siderably more precise. Thus, Colombia clearly offers the foreign investor only
two foreign investment structures, a Colombian company (sociedad mercantil)
14. Texas Business Corporation Act, 3A Thx REV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1990);
Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act, Thx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 (Vernon Supp.
1990); Texas Uniform Partnership Act, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT, ANN. art. 6132b (Vernon 1970 & Supp.
1990).
15. The Decisions generally use constituida to mean "incorporated," establecida to mean "reg-
istered or functioning as a branch," and empresa to mean either an enterprise or its branch. See, e.g.,
Decision 24, supra note 2, arts. 1, 6(a), 8, 9, 12-15, 17; see also Decision 24, supra note 2, art.
1, as amended by Decision 103, VII(l) RJ 72. The "fade-out" provisions of Decision 24, however,
introduce the uncoordinated concept of enterprises that are actualmente existentes ("presently ex-
isting") on certain dates, and amending Decisions inconsistently refer to such enterprises as being
constituidas or establecidas. See Decision 24, supra note 2, art. 28, as amended by Decision 103,
VII(I) RJ 17. Compare the use of existentes in Decision 24, supra note 2, arts. 29, 40-41. Decision
24 also contains uncoordinated references to foreign enterprises que se establezean ("that are es-
tablished"), Decision 24, supra note 2, art. 30, and que operan ("that operate"), Decision 24, supra
note 2, art. 43.
16. See Decision 24, supra note 2, art. 16 (regarding intra-group interest rates) and art. 21
(regarding intra-group royalties), which use casa matriz andfiliales in a generalized manner that may
refer to parent/subsidiary, head office/branch, or both.
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or the Colombian branch (sucursal) of a non-Colombian company. 17 Except for
local activities of service contractors and "domiciliations" required by law,
Ecuador requires minimum assigned capital for an Ecuadorean branch (sucur-
sal), prohibits certain branch activities, and imposes special obligations on
branches engaged in banking, insurance, finance, and oil and gas operations. 
18
Venezuela accepts the "domiciliation" of foreign enterprises as service
contractors, 19 but expressly contemplates the formation by foreign enterprises of
Venezuelan subsidiaries, 2 ° and requires certain Venezuelan branches of foreign
enterprises to be transformed into Venezuelan companies. 2'
Comparing the language of the ANCOM Decisions with that of the national
enactments, one has the impression that the Andean Commission took the intel-
lectual liberty of regarding foreign investment as an economic abstraction, thus
devolving upon the ANCOM nations the functional responsibility of dealing with
specific foreign investment structures. The discharge of that responsibility appears
to have had the beneficial result of increasing the sophistication of discrimination
between subsidiaries and branches in the ANCOM nations' domestic business law.
C. LICENSE TERMS
If xenophobia was the economic religion of the 1970s in the less developed
world, in the theology of that religion foreign equity was assigned a lower level
of perdition than foreign technology. Foreign equity was to be excluded entirely,
if possible. If than were not possible, only minority shares were to be permitted.
Foreign technology, in contrast, was welcome, provided it came under nononerous
conditions. Ideally, the technology should be "transferred" (once paid for, always
owned) and not "licensed" (available only during the paid-for period). If it must
be "licensed," the license terms should not be overly restrictive of the licensee.
The vocabulary of Decision 24 echoes that litany. Although its caption2 2 and
earliest antecedent reference 23 speak in terms of licensing, a later antecedent
reference 24 and most of its operative provisions 25 are couched in terms of the
17. Decreto No. 1265, July 10, 1987, LEGISLACION ECONOMICA, July 1987, at 41, art. 8.
18. Decreto No. 3095, July 29, 1987, REGISTRO OFICIAL July 29, 1987, at 5, arts. 33-48.
19. Decreto No. 1200, supra note 12, note 1(11).
20. Id. art. 52.
21. Id. art. 53.
22. Regimen Comtin de Tratamiento a los Capitales Extranjeros y sobre Marcas, Patentes,
Licencias y Regalfas (emphasis added).
23. -[E]l uso de la moderna tecnologia" (considerando clause, quoting from the Declaration
of Bogoti, proclaimed Aug. 16, 1966, 15 SINTESIS MENSUAL 35 (Sept. 1966), reprinted in INTER-
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE CARIBBEAN 149 (1975)).
24. "[E]l traspaso de tecnologias extranjeras" Id. (quoting from the first meeting of ANCOM's
Foreign Ministers).
25. See Decision 24, supra note 2, arts. 19, 48, 51, 52, & transitory art. D. Compare "aporte
• ..de fecnolog(a fordnea" (Declaratory Clause 1) and "el mayor acceso posible a la tecnologia
moderna" (Declaratory Clause 6).
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"transfer" or "importation" of technology. Occasional verbiage distinctions
suggest that while patents and trademarks may be the subject of contract or
license, technology as such must be "transferred" or "imported. ' 26
In a document as significant as Decision 24, such usage has undoubtedly re-
inforced in the domestic legal thinking of ANCOM nations the concept that in-
bound foreign technology is not merely "licensed" but "transferred." More spe-
cific accomplishments of Decision 24 are its clauses that prescribe what an
inbound conveyance of intellectual property rights must and must not contain. The
prohibition lists, in particular, are quite detailed. As to technology and patents,
they forbid clauses that require the recipient to buy goods or services from spec-
ified sources; that allow the grantor to prescribe the prices the recipient charges
third parties; that limit the recipient's production; that restrict the recipient's use
of competing technology; that give the grantor a purchase option; that impose
grant-backs of the recipient's related technology innovations; that require the
recipient to pay license fees for unused patents; and (with exceptions) that restrict
the recipient's exports.27 As to trademarks, the prohibitions are analogous.28
Those prohibitions were reiterated in Decision 220 and thus remain legally
effective in all ANCOM nations. They were independently enacted, with em-
bellishments, by Venezuela. 29 Although they are phrased as applicable to in-
bound transactions, 30 they are of such universal relevance that practitioners in
ANCOM nations will most likely use them as a standard negotiating checklist-
something of an informal law merchant-for all licenses, whether inbound,
outbound, or purely domestic. If so, it will be another example of second-tier
devolution, from international to domestic law, accomplished by Decision 24.
D. EXORCISING THE GHOST
The ephemeral nature of explicit legislative restrictions on foreign investment
is aptly demonstrated by the last two decades of ANCOM enactments: when
policies change, statutes are amended and repealed. Some impediments to the
entry of foreign capital, however, are more difficult to dislodge because they are
not merely legislated but are implanted in the cultural mind-set of a nation or
region. In Latin America the cultural impediment to foreign investment that
most tenaciously resists dislodging is the Calvo Doctrine, the principle that
dispositions of a foreign investor's assets must ultimately be determined by the
26. Id. arts. 18, 20, 25. But cf art. 6(f).
27. Id. art. 20.
28. Id. art. 23.
29. Decreto No. 1200, supra note 12, arts. 66, 70-71.
30. Literally, "'contratos sobre transferencia de tecnolog(a externa o sobre patentes" (contracts
concerning transfer of foreign technology or concerning patents) and "'contratos de licencia para la
explotacirn de marcas de origen extranjero en el territorio de los Parses Miembros" (license
contracts for the exploitation of trademarks of foreign origin in the territory of Member Nations).
Decision 220, supra note 8, arts. 20, 25.
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courts and law of the receiving nation and cannot be subrogated to a foreign
sovereign or relegated to an external institution or a foreign law.
From the standpoint of a capital-importing nation, the Calvo Doctrine had
some plausibility a century ago, when Carlos Calvo, the Argentine diplomat and
jurist, articulated it.3 1 It was the age of gunboat diplomacy and bilateral con-
frontation, when investment disputes were resolved by a capitalist nation's naval
blockade. Now times have changed. We live in a world of multilateral arbitration
treaties, and of impartial dispute-resolution agencies such as the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Multilateral In-
vestment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), in which are reliable, consensually cho-
sen, third-party deciders of foreign investment disputes. But the ghost of Carlos
Calvo still haunts the mind-set of Latin America. For example, of the twenty
independent nations of continental Latin America only twelve adhere to the
Inter-American Convention on Commercial Arbitration, only ten to the United
Nations Arbitration Convention, only five to ICSID, and only three to MIGA;32
and experience demonstrates that such impediments-by-omission to foreign in-
vestment are much more difficult than ordinary legislation to repeal.
On that score the Andean measures have substantially advanced the access of
foreign investment and technology, not by an affirmative action but by the
elimination of a negative one. Decision 24 expressly instituted the Calvo Doc-
trine as obligatory for all ANCOM nations: "In no instrument related to invest-
ments or transfer of technology will be admitted clauses that remove possible
conflicts or controversies from the national jurisdiction and competence of the
receiving country or that permit the subrogation by States of the rights and claims
of their national investors." 33 If that edict had remained in place, and were
literally applied, it would have alienated prospective investors and licensors by
denying even consensual access to external arbitration, private or institutional,
for the resolution of investment or licensing disputes. Fortunately, Decision 220
repealed it, leaving each ANCOM nation free to adopt the law of dispute reso-
lution that it chooses: "In the solution of controversies or conflicts derived from
direct foreign investments or from the transfer of foreign technology, the Mem-
ber Nations will apply that provided in their internal legislations. ' 3 4 While the
ghost of Carlos Calvo is not yet exorcised from Latin America, Decision 220 has
denied it an ANCOM passport to roam the Andes at will.
V. A Ruler from the Grave
Viewed from the perspective of the 1990s, Decision 24 is reminiscent of
Maitland's famous epigram, "The forms of action we have buried, but they still
31. C. CALVO, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL TEORICO Y PRACTICO DE EUROPA Y AMtRICA (1868).
32. See 5 INSTITUTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION, NEWS & NOTES, No. 1, Jan. 1990.
33. Decision 24, supra note 2, art. 51.
34. Decision 220, supra note 8, art. 34.
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rule us from their graves." 35 In a very real sense Decision 24 has been buried,
not only by Decision 220 and its national implementations, but also by the less
developed world's sea change in attitude toward foreign investment since the
xenophobic 1970s.
Buried though it may be, Decision 24 still exercises from its grave a powerful
normative force over the public and private law of the ANCOM nations and
beyond. Although it failed to discharge its basic public international law purpose
of requiring a highly restrictive standard in the foreign investment laws of the
ANCOM nations, the profile Decision 24 created of a modern foreign investment
law is unsurpassed in conceptual scope and will in all likelihood endure as a form
of private international law for many nations and decades to come. The norms
that Decision 24 generated of standard license terms and regulatory distinctions
between branches and subsidiaries have increased the sophistication of Latin
American business law in areas of private international law that will impact
purely domestic law. Certainly Decision 24's prohibition of bearer shares has
significantly altered the domestic business enterprise law of ANCOM nations.
And history will probably record that the most affirmative encouragement of
foreign investment produced by any Andean measure of the last two decades was
Decision 24's unintended rebuff, by failed endorsement, of Carlos Calvo.
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